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Abstract 
The less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998) is a preference for the lesser of two alternatives 
sometimes observed when they are evaluated separately. For example, a dinner service of 24 
intact pieces might be judged to be more valuable than a 40-piece dinner service containing 
nine broken pieces. Pattison and Zentall (2014) reported similar sub-optimal choice behaviour 
in dogs using a simultaneous choice procedure. Given a choice between a single high-value 
food item (cheese) or an equivalent high-value item plus a lower-value food item (carrot), 
their dogs chose the individual item. In a subsequent test, the dogs preferred two high-value 
items to a single high-value item, suggesting that avoidance of multiple items did not cause 
the sub-optimal choice behaviour. In two experiments, we replicated Pattison and Zentall’s 
procedure while including additional controls. In Experiment 1, habituation of neophobia for 
multiple items was controlled for by intermixing the two types of test trial within a single 
experimental session. In Experiment 2, we controlled for avoidance of heterogeneous 
rewards by including test trials in which a choice was offered between the combination of 
items and a single low-value item. In both experiments we observed sub-optimal choice 
behaviour which could not be explained by either of these putative mechanisms. Our results, 
as well as those of Pattison and Zentall, are consistent with the suggestion that dogs’ 
assessment of the total value of multiple items is based, at least partly, on their average 
quality. 
  
  
More evidence that less is better: Sub-optimal choice in dogs 
 In a variety of situations, people make decisions which are sub-optimal and are based 
on heuristics rather than a rational and objective consideration of all available information 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). That is, they sometimes behave in a manner which is 
inconsistent with maximising their potential net gains. This can be true when people are asked 
to make a choice between alternatives or when they evaluate a single option. Some examples 
of such behaviour are the justification of effort (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Gerard & 
Mattewson, 1966; Norton, Mochon & Ariely, 2012), the sunk cost effect (e.g., Arkes & Blumer, 
1985), and gambling.  Explanations for these behaviours include (but are not limited to) 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), loss aversion (Thaler, 1980), difficulty interpreting 
probabilities (e.g., Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1995) and an intrinsic enjoyment of engaging in the 
behaviour (e.g., Ocean & Smith, 1993). Animals have also been found to display behaviour 
consistent with the justification of effort and sunk cost effects, as well as gambling  (for a 
review see Zentall, 2015).  
 The less-is-better (or less-is-more) effect is another example of sub-optimal behaviour 
in which people rate a smaller quantity as being better than a larger alternative. Hsee (1998) 
described a series of experiments in which participants i) judged the gift of a (relatively 
expensive) $45 scarf as being more generous than that of a (relatively cheap) $55 coat despite 
the absolute values of the two gifts, ii) were willing to pay more for a 5oz cup overfilled with 
7oz of ice cream than a 10oz cup underfilled with 8oz of ice cream even though they were 
told exactly how much ice cream was in the cup, and iii) were willing to pay more for a dinner 
service of 24 intact pieces than for a dinner service containing the same 24 intact pieces, plus 
an addition 16 pieces 9 of which were broken. In a baseball-card auction, List (2002) found 
  
that both professional sports card dealers and non-dealers made higher bids for bundles of 
10 mint condition cards (with a total value of $15) than they did for bundles containing 10 
mint condition cards plus three cards in poor condition (which had a total value of $18). 
Similar effects have been observed in a variety of situations. Medvec, Madey and Gilovich 
(1995) reported that athletes who won bronze medals at the 1992 Summer Olympic games 
tended to be happier than those who won silver medals. Chernev (2011; see also Jiang & Lei, 
2014) found that participants who were concerned about their weight estimated that the 
calorie content of several unhealthy meals (e.g., a hamburger or a bacon and cheese waffle 
sandwich) was greater than that of the same meal plus a healthy food item (some celery or 
an apple). 
 Some of these instances of the less-is-better effect may be attributed to 
counterfactual thinking (‘I could have won gold’ vs. ‘I could have won nothing’), or 
misconceptions about the benefits of healthy food. The most common explanation of the 
effect, however, is that people’s decisions are influenced by affective heuristics based on 
attributes of an item that are readily evaluable (Hsee, 1996). It might be relatively difficult, 
for example, to say just how valuable a 24-piece, or a 40-piece, dinner service is, but it is 
obvious that one containing broken pieces is sub-standard. 
 Kralick, Xu, Knight, Khan and Levine (2012) found a similar less-is-better effect in 
rhesus monkeys when they were offered a simultaneous choice between two food rewards. 
Both laboratory and wild monkeys showed a preference for a single high value food item (a 
grape or a piece of apple) over a combination of the same high value item plus a lower-value 
item (a sugar snap pea, green bean, or slice of cucumber). When the low-value item was 
offered by itself, the monkeys readily ate it, suggesting that rejection of the combination of 
  
items was not due to an aversion for the lower-value item. Kralick et al concluded that 
monkeys may employ an affective heuristic when making choices in time-sensitive situations 
such as foraging.   
 The less-is-better effect has also been observed in non-primate species. Zentall, 
Laude, Case and Daniels (2014) found that pigeons preferred a single high-value pea over a 
pea plus a low-value milo seed when the birds were fed on a relatively unrestricted diet, 
although the effect was reversed for food-deprived pigeons. Pattison & Zentall (2014) tested 
dogs who would each readily eat pieces of both carrot and cheese alone, but preferred cheese 
when given a choice between them. On test trials, nine out of their ten dogs showed a 
preference for a piece of cheese by itself over a piece of cheese plus a piece of carrot. One 
possible explanation for this effect is that dogs prefer single items of food over multiple items, 
at least when they are well-fed. To test for this possibility, in a second test session Pattison & 
Zentall gave the dogs a choice between a single piece of cheese or two pieces of cheese. The 
dogs chose the two pieces of cheese on almost every occasion. It is possible, however, that 
the dogs avoided multiple items when they first encountered them in the initial, less-is-better, 
test session but that this avoidance response habituated over the course of the session and 
was not present on the subsequent control test session. 
 The purpose of the experiments reported here was twofold. First, to replicate the 
procedure of Pattison and Zentall (2014) to further explore the evidence for a less-is-better 
effect is domestic dogs. Second, to control for potential explanations for the effect in terms 
of avoidance of either i) multiple rewards (Experiment 1), or ii) heterogenous rewards 
(Experiment 2). 
  
Experiment 1 
 The design of Experiment 1 was very similar to that of Pattison and Zentall’s (2014) 
experiment. In a preliminary session of training we established that each dog would consume 
each of the three rewards used in the experiment – a single high-value food item, a single 
low-value food item, and the combination of the high- and low-value items – and that they 
showed a preference for the high value item when offered a choice between it and the low-
value item. In a subsequent test session, three types of choice trials were administered. On 
24 standard trials a choice was offered between a single high-value item and a single low-
value item. Randomly intermixed with the standard trials were six probe test trials and six 
control trials. On each probe test trial the dogs were offered a single high-value item in one 
hand or the combination of a high-value item and a low-value item in the other hand. On the 
basis of Pattison and Zentall’s results, it was expected that dogs would choose the single high-
value item in preference over the mixture of items. That is, we expected the dogs to 
demonstrate a less-is-better effect by selecting the smaller overall reward on these trials. On 
control trials, dogs chose between a single high-value item in one hand and two high-value 
items in the other hand. These trials were included because, other than on the probe test 
trials, the dogs had not previously been offered the choice between one and two items as 
part of the experiment. It is, therefore, possible that a less-is-better effect could be observed 
simply because the dogs avoided multiple items in favour of individual items. Pattison and 
Zentall included similar control trials in their experiment, but in a second test session at least 
six hours after the less-is-better test session. Because the control trials were administered in 
a later session it is possible that their dogs had an initial tendency to avoid multiple items but 
that this avoidance response habituated over the course of training and was not evident in 
  
the session test session. By intermixing probe test and control trials within a single test 
session, we were able to rule out this explanation of our results. 
Method 
Participants. Nine dogs were recruited for the experiment (see Table 1 for details). All were 
owned by members of the public known to one of the authors. The dogs were aged between 
5 and 120 months old (M = 40.2; SD = 38.2), weighed between 7 and 45kg (M = 15.4; SD = 
11.7) and six were male. There were two English Cocker Spaniels, one Doberman Pinscher, 
one Cavalier King Charles Spaniel, one Jack Russel Terrier, and four spaniel cross-breeds 
(Cavalier King Charles Spaniel x Bichon Frise, English Cocker Spaniel x Poodle, English Cocker 
Spaniel x Schnauzer, English Cocker Spaniel x Jack Russel Terrier). 
Materials. Following Pattison and Zentall (2014), carrots (Grower’s Selection, ASDA) were 
used as the low-value item for all dogs. High-value items were chosen for each dog 
individually based on the recommendation of its owner and were given as treats as part of 
that dog’s normal diet. The high-value item was string cheese (Cheestrings Original, 
Cheestrings) for two dogs, cooked chicken (Chicken Chunks, SPAR) for three dogs, and hotdog 
sausages (Original Hot Dogs, Princes) for the remaining four dogs. Low- and high-value items 
were cut into 5mm slices of 10mm diameter for dogs weighing over 12kg and 2.5mm slices of 
5mm diameter for smaller dogs. All food items were placed in separate plastic containers and 
were kept out of sight and reach of the dogs during the experiment. Fragrance free wipes 
(Chemical Free Baby Wipes, Waterwipes) were used after each trial to clean the 
experimenter’s hands. 
  
Procedure. All testing took place in the dogs’ homes in the presence of their owners over two 
sessions. At the beginning of the screening session, three simple consumption tests were 
administered in which the dog was offered i) a single low-value item, ii) a single high-value 
item, or iii) a low-value item and a high-value item. These tests were conducted in a random 
order for each dog, with an interval of five minutes between tests. Once it had been confirmed 
that all dogs would consume the different foods, ten standard choice trials were delivered, 
using a procedure closely modelled on that used by Pattison and Zentall (2014). On each trial, 
the experimenter knelt on the floor directly in front of, and facing, the dog which was seated 
approximately 1m away. The dog’s owner was seated immediately behind the dog, and held 
onto the dog’s collar until instructed to let go. At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter 
held up her left hand, keeping it open, and announced the food that was being offered. The 
same was repeated with her right hand, so that the dog could see and smell the items in each 
hand. Both hands were then lowered, palms facing up, and with the items in the centre of 
each palm, until they were flat on the floor in front and to the sides of the experimenter’s 
legs. Throughout this process, the experimenter’s gaze remained fixed on the floor in front of 
her. After approximately three seconds the experimenter gave the verbal cue ‘Choose’, at 
which point the owner released their hold on the dog’s collar. As soon as the dog made 
contact with either one of the experimenter’s hands, the other hand was closed to cover the 
overlooked item(s), and the dog was allowed to consume the chosen item(s) before returning 
to its owner. The experimenter then cleaned her hands with water wipes and prepared the 
items for the next trial. On each of these standard trials, the dogs were given a choice between 
a single low-value item and a single high-value item. The hand containing the high-value item 
varied from trial to trial in a pseudo random order with the constraints that it was held in each 
hand on half of the trials, and that there were no more than three successive trials on which 
  
it was held in the same hand. There was an interval of approximately one to two minutes 
between successive trials, as the dog returned to its owner and the experimenter prepared 
for the next trial. 
The experimental session took place on the following day. This session consisted of 24 
standard trials which were conducted in the same manner as those during the screening 
session. 12 test trials were randomly intermixed with the standard trials. Six of these were 
probe trials in which the dogs were given a choice between a single high-value item and the 
combination of a low-value item and a high-value item. The remaining six trials were control 
trials in which the choice was between a single high-value item and two high-value items. 
Across standard, probe, and control test trials, the high-value item was offered equally often 
in each hand. There were an equal number of each type of test trial in the first and second 
halves of the experimental session. No more than four standard, or two test, trials occurred 
in succession.  
Results and discussion 
All dogs ate each of the three items or combinations of items during the initial 
consumption test. No dog exclusively chose one hand during the screening trials, but two 
(Benson and Harvey) did choose the right hand on nine out of ten trials. An exact binomial 
test indicated that this was more than would be expected by chance, p = .021. No dog, 
however, showed a significant side bias during the experimental session. The most times that 
any dog chose either one side during that session was 24 times out of 36, which an exact 
binomial test found was not statistically significant, p = .065. The three dogs who chose one 
side 24 times (Barney, Benson, and Poppy) were included in the analyses reported below, but 
additional tests were performed from which their data were excluded. Because these tests 
  
revealed the same overall pattern of results and significant effects, their results are not 
reported. 
The proportion of trials on which each dog made the optimal choice (high-value item 
on standard trials or the combination of two items on test trials) is shown in Figure 1. All dogs 
chose the single high-value item more often than the single low-value item on standard trials. 
The mean percentage of trials on which the high-value item was chosen was 71.3% (range 
54%-96%). A one-sample t-test of individual choice behaviour showed that the high-value 
item was chosen significantly more than the low value item, t(8) = 5.47, p < .001, d = 1.82, 
95% confidence interval of the mean (CI)[62.3, 80.3]. 
On probe test trials, six of the nine dogs chose the combination of a high-value item 
and a low-value item less often than the single high-value item. The remaining three dogs 
chose the two alternatives equally often. Overall, the combination of items was selected on 
just 27.8% of trials (range 0%-50%), which a one-sample t-test found was significantly less 
than the single high-value item, t(8) = 3.02, p = .016, d = 1.01, 95% CI[10.8, 44.7]. 
Seven of the nine dogs chose the two high-value items more often than a single high-
value item on the control test trials. The other two dogs showed no preference. The two high-
value items were chosen on 68.5% of all trials (range 50%-83%), which was significantly more 
than the single high-value item according to a one-sample t-test, t(8) = 4.26, p = .003, d = 1.42, 
95% CI[58.5, 78.5]. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 We successfully replicated the less-is-better effect previously reported by Pattison and 
Zentall (2014). Six out of nine dogs showed a less-is-better effect: a preference for a single 
  
high-value item over the combination of a high-value item plus a low-value item. The 
remaining three dogs showed no preference for either alternative. On control trials, most 
dogs also showed a preference for two high-value items over a single high-value item. This 
suggests that the less-is-better effect was not due to avoidance of multiple items on the probe 
test trials. The probe test trials were, however, the only occasions on which the dogs were 
given a choice where one of the alternatives consisted of a mixture of different items. It is, 
therefore, possible that the less-is-better effect was caused by an avoidance not of multiple 
items, but of a heterogeneous collection of items. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test 
this possibility. 
Experiment 2 
 The same nine dogs were tested in a single session at least a week after the completion 
of Experiment 1. This session was same as the test session of Experiment 1 with the exception 
that the dogs were offered a choice between a single low-value item and a combination of a 
low-value item and a high-value item on the six control trials. 
Method 
Participants. The participants were the same nine dogs that took park it Experiment 1. 
Materials. The materials were the same as for Experiment 1. 
Procedure. Testing took place approximately one week after Experiment 1. The procedure 
was the same as for Experiment 1 with two exceptions. Because all of the dogs had taken part 
in Experiment 1, there was no initial screening session and all testing took place in a single 
session. On each of the six control trials, the dogs were given a choice between a single low-
  
value item and the combination of a high-value item and a low-value item. The hands in which 
these were held was counterbalanced across trials.  
Results and discussion 
No dog showed a significant side bias during the experimental session. The most times 
that any dog chose one side during that session was 23 times out of 36, which an exact 
binomial test found was not statistically significant, p= .132. 
The proportion of trials on which each dog made the optimal choice (high-value item 
on standard trials or the combination of two items on test trials) is shown in Figure 2. All dogs 
chose the single high-value item more often than the single low-value item on standard trials. 
The mean percentage of trials on which the high-value item was chosen was 90.7% (range 
79%-96%). A one-sample t-test of individual choice behaviour showed that the high-value 
item was chosen significantly more than the low value item, t(8) = 19.8, p < .0001, d = 6.60, 
95% CI[86.0, 95.5]. 
On probe test trials, all of the nine dogs chose the combination of a high-value item 
and a low-value item less often than the single high-value item. Across all trials, the 
combination of items was selected on just 13% of trials (range 0%-33%), which a one-sample 
t-test found was significantly less than the single high-value item, t(8) = 8.00, p < .0001, d = 
2.67, 95% CI[2.3, 23.6]. 
All of the dogs chose the combination of a high-value item and a low-value item more 
often than a single low-value item on the control test trials. The combination of items was 
chosen on 88.9% (range 67%-100%) of all trials, which was significantly more than the single 
  
low-value item according to a one-sample t-test, t(8) = 8.08, p < .0001, d = 2.69, 95% CI[77.8, 
100.0]. 
<Figure 2 about here> 
We again found a clear less-is-better effect on the probe test trials. Each of the nine 
dogs selected the single high-value item more frequently than the combination of a high-
value item and a low-value item. On the control trials, however, all nine dogs chose the 
combination of items in preference over a single low-value item. These results suggest that 
the less-is-better effect is not caused by an avoidance of heterogeneous rewards. 
General discussion 
 In two experiments we observed a less-is-better effect in domestic dogs. Each dog was 
happy to consume either a high-value item (a piece of cheese, chicken, or hotdog) or a low-
value item (a piece of carrot) alone. When given a choice between a high-value item and a 
piece of carrot, the dogs reliably chose the high-value item. On probe test trials, however, 
where they were given a choice between a single high-value item and an identical high-value 
item plus a piece of carrot, the dogs chose the alternative with the lower total value – the 
single high-value item. Control trials in Experiment 1 showed that this effect was not caused 
by an avoidance of multiple food items; the dogs chose two high-value items in preference 
over a single high-value item. On control trials in Experiment 2, the dogs were offered a choice 
between the combination of a high-value item and a piece of carrot in one hand or a piece of 
carrot by itself in the other hand. The dogs preferred the combination of items, suggesting 
that their choice on probe test trials was not determined by an avoidance of heterogeneous 
collections of food items. 
  
Optimal foraging theory (Stephens & Krebs, 1986) suggest that animals should always 
chose the option which will lead to the greatest net energy gain. In the simple tasks that have 
been discussed here animals were given a choice between two alternatives with a delay 
between trials. In these situations, they should select the most calorific option because this 
will maximise their rate of energy gain over the testing session. Failure to behave optimally 
does not reflect an inability to discriminate between quantities. Non-human animals including 
great apes (Beran, 2001; Call, 2000; Hanus & Call, 2007; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh & 
Hegel, 1987), old world monkeys (Jordan & Brannon, 2006), new world monkeys (e.g., 
Addessi, Crescimbene & Visalberghi, 2008; Anderson, Awazu & Fujita, 2000; Gazes, Billas & 
Schmitt, 2017), rodents (Panteleeva, Reznikova & Vygonyailova, 2013), birds (Kelly, 2016), fish 
(Agrillo, Dadda & Bisazza, 2007; Agrillo, Dadda, Serena & Bisazza, 2008), amphibians (Uller, 
Jaeger, Guidry & Martin, 2003), and canids (Baker, Shivik & Jordan, 2011; Utrata, Virányi & 
Range 2012), including domestic dogs (Baker, Morath, Rodzon & Jordan, 2012; Miletto 
Petrazzini & Wynne, 2016; Prato-Previde, Marshall-Pescini & Valsecchi, 2008; Ward & Smuts, 
2007), have all been found to be capable of quantity discrimination and, where tested, show 
a preference for larger quantities over smaller quantities of the same food. We also found 
evidence for such a preference. On control trials in Experiment 1, the dogs were given a choice 
between one and two of the same high-value items and showed a significant preference for 
the two items (see also Pattison & Zentall, 2014).  
Quantity judgements are, however, sensitive to a number of factors. For example, 
when chimpanzees were presented with sets of different sized pieces of the same food 
(graham crackers), Beran, Evans and Harris (2008) found that they sometimes chose the set 
containing the smaller total amount of food but the largest single item (but see Miletto 
  
Petrazzini & Wynne, 2016 for a failure to replicate this effect in dogs). The absolute size of 
each alternative (the magnitude effect) and the difference between them (the distance effect) 
also affect preference for the larger total amount of food (e.g., Call, 2000; Hanus & Call, 2007; 
Silderberg, Widholm, Bresler, Fujita & Anderson, 1998). Silderberg et al (1998) also found that 
rhesus macaques tend to ignore quantities of food larger than that which can be consumed 
in a single meal, and only assign a value to the preferred food type within a mixture (the 
selective value effect). While each of these factors might explain a reduction, or the 
elimination of, a preference for the larger of two collections of food items, none of them, 
either individually or together, can explain the reversal of the preference observed in our 
experiments. Beran, Evans and Ratliff (2009) found that when chimpanzees were given a 
choice between one large food item and an identical large item plus a smaller piece of the 
same food, they often showed no preference for either alternative. They speculated that the 
apes may have been reluctant to choose the pair of items in fear that they might only receive 
the smaller of the two items. Their later experiments, however, provided no support for this 
hypothesis and it is unlikely that such a fear could explain the results of our experiments. Six 
of our nine dogs selected the combination of items on at least two probe test trials, and all 
dogs chose the two high value items on at least three control trials in Experiment 1. This gave 
the dogs plenty of opportunity to learn that they got to keep all items that they chose but, if 
anything, they showed a greater preference for the single high value item on probe test trials 
in Experiment 2. 
 Hsee (1998) attributed the less-is-better effect in humans to the influence of affective 
heuristics on decision making. Some attributes of objects or situations are difficult to evaluate 
independently, whereas other attributes are more easily evaluable. When people are asked 
  
to make separate evaluations of items, they base their decision on the easily evaluable 
attributes. It may be difficult to judge the absolute effect that the number of pieces in a dinner 
service might have on its value, but it is obvious that a dinner service containing broken pieces 
is deficient. Hence, people may be willing to pay a higher price when presented with a set of 
24 intact pieces than when they are presented with a set of 40 pieces, 9 of which are broken. 
If the two alternatives are presented together, however, they may be compared on all of their 
attributes and a relative judgement can be made. Under conditions of joint evaluation, the 
less-is-better effect tends to be reversed and people’s judgement of items follows their 
monetary value. Further support for the evaluability hypothesis was provided by Hsee (1996), 
who systematically manipulated the evaluability of object’s attributes and observed an effect 
of evaluability when items were separately evaluated, but not when they were jointly 
evaluated. In the experiments reported here, and in previous demonstrations of the less-is-
better effect in non-human animals (e.g., Kralik et al, 2012; Pattison & Zentall, 2014; Zentall 
et al, 2014), the subjects have been offered a simultaneous choice between the alternative – 
the condition under which the effect is not observed in humans. In a simultaneous choice 
task, Beran, Ratliff and Evans (2009) found that chimpanzees tended to make the optimal 
choice. Their chimpanzees showed a preference for a single piece of banana over a single 
piece of apple. When offered a choice between a piece of banana alone, or a piece of banana 
plus a piece of apple, two chimpanzees preferred the mixture of items whereas two other 
chimpanzees showed no preference. Kralik et al (2012) suggest that the difference between 
the optimal performance on simultaneous choice tasks of humans and chimpanzees and the 
sub-optimal performance of rhesus monkeys (and, by extension, pigeons and dogs) can be 
explained if all of these species make use of affective heuristics, but differ in their ability to 
  
override the heuristics where appropriate. Hominids’ executive functions may allow them to 
behave more flexibly than other species.  
 Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber and Redelmeier (1993) exposed human 
participants to two unpleasant conditions. In one condition, they were required to immerse 
one hand into cold water (14°C) for 60 s. In the other condition, they immersed the hand in 
the cold water for 60 s and then for an additional 30 s during which the temperature of the 
water was gradually raised slightly, but sufficiently to significantly reduce the associated pain 
(to 15°C). When they were later asked which experience they would prefer to repeat, most 
participants (69%) chose the longer trial. This result is analogous to the less-is-better effect 
since participants found the short trial, during which they presumably experienced less total 
pain, to be more aversive than the longer trial. Kahneman et al suggested that participants 
selected the long trial because their retrospective evaluation of the experiences were based 
largely upon their worst point (which might be expected to be the same in each case) and 
their final moments. Because the long trial ended with less pain than the short trial, it was 
evaluated as less unpleasant. It is possible that the choices made by our dogs might be 
explained in a similar way if we assume that when they chose the mixture of items they ate 
the high-value item first and the piece of carrot second. We have no way of knowing whether 
this is the case; when a dog made a choice, the item(s) that they had selected were offered 
in an open hand and the dog took them into its mouth. The performance of the dogs is, 
however, consistent with the suggestion that choices were influenced by past behaviour. All 
dogs had some limited experience of the mixture of items in the initial screening session of 
Experiment 1. During the test session, five of the nine dogs chose the mixture of items on 
their first probe test trial and one of the other four chose it on their second probe test trial. 
  
Hence, including the three dogs who selected the single high value item on all six probe test 
trials, all of the dogs had experience of the mixture before developing a preference for the 
single high-value item on their remaining probe test trials. In Experiment 2, which was 
conducted after the dogs had consumed the mixture of items in Experiment 1, and during 
which the mixture was also given on control test trial, the magnitude of the less-is-better 
effect was slightly larger than it had been in Experiment 1. Hence, it appears that the 
magnitude of the effect was affected by learning across the two experiments. A more direct 
test of the contribution of the end-point effect to the less-is-better effect in dogs might be 
conducted by ensuring that dogs receive the multiple food items, when chosen, in a specific 
order. 
 Another possibility is that the standard choice trials that made up the majority of trials 
in both experiments taught the dogs to avoid the piece of carrot. On these standard trials, the 
dogs were offered a piece of carrot in one hand, and a preferred food item in the other hand. 
The dogs earned the greatest reward on these trials both for selecting the preferred food, 
and for avoiding the carrot. Hence, the carrot may have been established as an explicit signal 
that the other alternative was better. This learning may have transferred to the probe test 
trials where avoidance of the carrot would lead the dogs to choose the single preferred item 
over the mixture containing carrot. Acquisition of such an avoidance response would explain 
the increase in the magnitude of the less-is-better effect from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. 
This account is also consistent with performance on the control test trials. In Experiment 1, 
no carrot was present on these trials and so the dogs simply chose the larger reward. In 
Experiment 2, carrot was present in both alternatives, and dogs chose the option containing 
the preferred food item. 
  
 In conclusion, when given the choice between a single high-value item and an identical 
high-value item plus a low-value item, dogs chose the single item meaning that they earned 
less food than they could have. This effect cannot be explained as an avoidance of multiple 
items, or avoidance of a mixture of items. Nor can it be explained as a failure to discriminate 
between quantities.  Our results are consistent with the suggestion that decision making in 
animals is influenced by the same type of affective heuristics that affect human decision 
making. Animals’ use of these heuristics may, however, be less flexible than humans’. Our 
dogs appear to have based their choices on an evaluation of the average quality of each 
alternative rather than their total calorific value despite their availability for side-by-side 
comparison. Use of a heuristic based on quality is, however, likely to result in optimal 
behaviour in many natural situations, and only produces sub-optimal behaviour in limited 
situations such as a deliberately contrived laboratory setting using a choice procedure which 
is unfamiliar to most animals. Alternatively, exposure to the choice procedure in the form of 
the numerous standard choice trials, might have resulted in the acquisition of a learned 
avoidance response for the low-value item. Clearly, these last two explanations of our results 
make opposite predictions about the effect of extended training on the magnitude of the less-
is-better effect which can be tested empirically. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Information about the dogs that participated in the experiments 
Dog Breed Age (months) Weight (kg) Sex High-value item 
Arthur English Cocker Spaniel x Schnauzer 14 7 M Hotdog 
Barney English Cocker Spaniel 15 14 M Cheese 
Benson English Cocker Spaniel x Poodle 12 12 M Hotdog 
Fudge Cavalier King Charles Spaniel 120 18 M Chicken 
Harvey Doberman Pinscher 48 45 M Hotdog 
Hetti English Cocker Spaniel x Jack Russel Terrier 19 8 F Hotdog 
Loroli Cavalier King Charles Spaniel x Bichon Frise 53 10 F Chicken 
Poppy Jack Russel Terrier 76 9 F Chicken 
Ralph English Cocker Spaniel 5 16 M Cheese 
 
  
  
Figure captions 
Figure 1. Percent optimal choices made by each dog during Experiment 1. Dogs reliably chose 
the high value item over the low value item on standard trials (top panel).  They also tended 
to choose a high value item over a high value item plus a low value item on probe test trials 
(middle panel). Two high value items were preferred to a single high value item on control 
trials (bottom panel). Dotted lines show chance performance (50%). 
Figure 2. Percent optimal choices made by each dog during Experiment 2. Dogs reliably chose 
the high value item over the low value item on standard trials (top panel).  They also reliably 
chose a high value item over a high value item plus a low value item on probe test trials 
(middle panel). The combination of a high value item and a low value item was preferred to a 
single low value item on control trials (bottom panel). Dotted lines show chance performance 
(50%). 
 
